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Bargaining for European Union Farm
Policy Reform through U.S.
Pesticide Restrictions
Lizbeth Martin, Philip L. Paarlberg, and John G. Lee
Future trade negotiations will incorporate environmental concerns. This study presents a
framework to evaluate whether the United States would be willing to adopt a pesticide
restriction in exchange for European Union liberalization of producer support. It outlines the
conditions that must be met if a bargain is to occur. Partial equilibrium commodity models
test whether the condhions for a bargaining solution are satisfied. The research results indicate
that a potentiat bargain is possible for stricter U.S. environmental regulations in coarse grains
if there is a sufficiently large positive EU externality. Conditions in the oilseed market
preclude a bargain.
Bargaining for European Union Farm Policy
Reform through U.S. Pesticide Restrictions
Liberalizing agricultural trade and treating domes-
tic environmental problems in the United States
and the European Union (EU), may be key consid-
erations in the next round of the World Trade Or-
ganization (wTO) negotiations. As concern over
the environment increases, countries are finding
fault with each other’s environmental practices.
Some in the European Union believe that it is un-
fair to compete with U.S. farmers who do not have
equally tight chemical use restrictions. Strict EU
environmental regulations are used to justify con-
tinued price supports for farmers (Williamson). In
the next WTO round, the European Union will be
pressed to further reduce domestic supports. After
the previous negotiations, a “Peace Clause” insu-
lated the reformed EU market support programs
from being challenged in the WTO (IATRC). Sec-
ond, the European Union will face the costs of
incorporating eastern European countries. Finally,
the United States should be in a strong negotiating
position because the 1996 farm bill fully decouples
U.S. payments where present EU payments are
only partially decoupled.
This paper investigates whether the United
States and European Union would be willing to
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bargain over a further liberalization of EU price
supports in return for pesticide use restrictions on
U.S. coarse grain and oilseed production, The pre-
vailing view is that such a bargain would not be
attractive to the United States. That prevailing
view is the hypothesis tested in this paper. The
paper begins by briefly developing the rationale
why such a bargain might be feasible. It then pre-
sents a conceptual model that determines the con-
ditions for a successful bargain. The final section
uses partial equilibrium models for coarse grains
and oilseeds to test whether those conditions are
satisfied for the market conditions projected for the
year 2005. The empirical results show that the pre-
vailing view is correct for oilseeds as the condi-
tions for a bargain are not satisfied. In the case of
coarse grains, the conditions for a successful bar-
gain could be satisfied if the benefits to the EU
from a U.S. pesticide restriction are large enough.
Background
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform of
1992 lowered price support for grains while com-
pensating producers with a system of direct pay-
ments. In addition, the reform partially united en-
vironmental, agricultural, and income policies by
moving some costs from price support to direct
payments (Scheele). Agro-environmental policy in
the European Union allows member countries flex-
ibility in program implementation. For example,
Atrazine use is banned by some EU members or138 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
used onlv under certain conditions in others
(Scheierl~ng). From the European farmer’s point of
view the restrictive pesticide policy reduces the
competitiveness of European agriculture andjusti-
fies continued producer support.
In the United States, agricultural policy evolved
to a system of fully decoupled farm payments. En-
vironmental policy in the United States has been
less aggressive despite concern over the environ-
mental consequences of pesticide and chemical use
in agriculture. Several studies detail the contribu-
tion of agriculture to the contamination of water
supplies (Barrington, Holtkamp and Johnson;
Nielsen and Lee; Curtis and Profeta; CARD).
Policy makers acknowledge that agricultural
chemicals impose costs on the environment and
human health, and there have been proposals to
ban certain chemicals, like Atrazine (Runge). Nev-
ertheless, the United States has not implemented
extensive taxesfbans on agricultural pesticide use
like European Union members.
There are a variety of possible incentives for the
United States and Euro~ean Union to consider a
bargain where the EU fu~her reduces farm support
while the United States reduces pesticide use. The
potential welfare gain for the United States stems
from a number of areas. The United States would
have a cleaner environment. Producer groups argue
that tighter environmental restrictions would be
costly and view these regulations as a threat. If the
European Union liberalizes its domestic support
policies, U.S. farmers would receive higher world
prices to offset either higher input costs or a loss in
yields resulting from the reduction in chemicals.
Groups in the European Union could also expe-
rience benefits. Further reforming of the CAP
would lower the cost of agricultural support pro-
grams and would make accession of new members
easier. Also there would be a rise in the world
price. Finally, there would be a corresponding in-
crease in environmental quality in both the United
States and the European Union as pollution from
pesticides is reduced. That would occur in the
United States directly from the restriction of pes-
ticide use and in the European Union from less
intensive use of chemicals as the domestic pro-
ducer price falls due to reform.
Conceptual Model
There have been several bargaining models which
utilize trade or environmental policy instruments
but few studies combine trade and environmental
policy tools in a bargaining game (Ballenger, Kris-
soff and Beattie). This model is based on Gallagh-
er’s model depicting EU grain policy as a result of
a “bargaining” process. The conditions under
which a bargain between U.S. pesticide policy and
EU producer support could evolve are illustrated in
figure 1. The United States and European Union
bargain over two instruments set by policy makers:
the level of U.S. pesticide restriction (Ru~) and the
per ton difference between the internal EU price
and the world price (t~u). The beginning situation
reflects the current case with a positive EU support
policy, to~u >0, and no U.S. pesticide restriction,
~ou~ = O. The initial welfare level for the United
States is @us and the initial EU welfare level is
UOEU.
Policies in each country are assumed to be set by
a policy maker maximizing the weighted sum of
producer, consumer, and taxpayer welfare (Sarris
and Freebairn; Rausser and Freebairn; Paarlberg
and Abbott). The weights reflect the marginal
value the policy maker places on the welfare of
each interest group. The decision variable for the
U.S. policy maker is the restriction on U.S. pesti-
cide use (Rus) while the decision variable for the
EU policy maker is the gap between the EU inter-
nal price and the world price (t~u). When setting
these policies each policy maker must account for
the rival’s policy as well as for the impacts of both
policies on the world price. An additional feature
of the welfare functions is the presence of an ex-
ternality. That is, the EU policy maker is affected
by the U.S. pesticide restriction. The U.S. policy
maker is not directly affected by the EU support.
Rather, the impact of that enters via its impact on
the world price. The U.S. policy maker is assumed
to be affected by the U.S. pesticide restriction.
Iso-welfare contours give the combinations of
tEuand Ru~ where welfare of the policy maker in
each country is constant. These are found by
changing the level of EU farm support and finding
the level of U.S. pesticide restriction such that the
welfare of each policy maker is constant allowing
for the effects of both policies on the world price.
For a bargain to be reached the iso-welfare con-
tours must exhibit a number of properties, Each
region’s contour must be negatively sloped. For the
United States to hold welfare constant, its pesticide
restriction (Ru~) must increase as the EU policy is
liberalized. For the European Union to hold wel-
fare constant, a lower support policy (tEu) must be
offered in return for a more restrictive U.S. pesti-
cide policy.
The slope of the U.S. iso-welfare contour is la-
beled the marginal rate of substitution between the
policies (A4R$J. For the United States this indi-
cates the willingness to increase its pesticide re-
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Figure 1. A Bargaining Model for the United States and the European Union
support. This willingness UIW fall as tEu de-
creases, so the iso-welfare contours for the United
States are quasi-concave. That is, the more liberal
EU policy becomes, the less willing the United
States is to offer an increase in its pesticide restric-
tion. The minimum acceptable amount of pesticide
restriction the European Union must have to agree
to reduce farm support is given by the slope of EU
iso-welfare contour (MRS~u). As tEufalls, the Eu-
ropean Union must require larger increases in U.S.
pesticide restrictions to maintain constant welfare.
Thus, the EU iso-welfare contour must be quasi-
convex.
For a bargain to be reached, the U.S. iso-welfare
contours must be indexed toward the origin be-
cause as the European Union liberalizes its policy
the welfare of the United States rises if a tighter
pesticide restriction is not implemented. Thus,
fi ure 1 corresponds to a higher level of U’us in g
welfare for the United States than @us. For the
European Union, increases in EU support generate
higher EU welfare so higher EU iso-welfare con-
tOUL$, like @=u, UIUSt be fUrthCX frOIn theOnh. t At the initial equilibrium in figure 1 (t ~u,
ROUS), the klRSu~ > MRSEU so a bargain is pos-
sible. The willingness of the United States to re-
strict pesticide use exceeds that which the EU must
have to lower producer support, Negotiations con-
tinue until the increase in Ru~ the U.S. is willing to
offer equals the increase in pesticide restrictions
(RUJ that the EU requires, This is where the iso-
welfare contours of the two countries are tangent.
The set of tangencies in figure 1, represented by
the line segment AB, is the possible solution set
because the marginal rates of substitution between
regions are equal. Point A represents the best out-
come for the United States as the EU policy cut is
larger and the U.S. pesticide restriction is lower.
Point B is the European Union’s preferred outcome
as there is less of a reduction in EU support and a
larger U.S. pesticide restriction, Any point on AB
is a potential outcome. The tangency condition140 October 1999
shows why the assumptions on shape of the iso-
welfare contours are critical. If the U.S. iso-welfare
contour were not quasi-concave, there would be
multiple tangent points, like point A, along the
quasi-convex EU contour.
This is how a bargain could evolve between the
United States and the European Union. While the
conceptual model illustrates the potential for a bar-
gain, it also suggests that a number of conditions
must be fulfilled. These conditions include the
proper slope of the iso-welfare contours, their con-
cavity, their indexing and the condition that
MRSu~ >MRSEU. Whether such conditions are met
is an empirical issue.
Empirical Model and Results
Commodity Model
Implementation of the bargaining process de-
scribed in figure 1 relies on single commodity,
partial equilibrium models for coarse grains and
oilseeds. Each model represents a long-run average
equilibrium with supply able to adjust to price
changes and stocks incorporated into the demand
and supply functions. The advantage of this model
is its simplicity, which facilitates obtaining the iso-
welfare contours. The models divide the world into
three regions: the United States—subscript “us,”
European Union—subscript “~u,” and the rest of
the world—denoted by subscript “w’’-which in-
cludes other exporters. Each model assumes a
single, homogeneous commodity. Both the United
States and the European Union are treated as ex-
porters in the coarse grains model, while in the
oilseeds model the European Union is a net im-
porter.
For both the United States and the European
Union, demand and supply relations are specified.
Supply of the commodity in the United States
(Sus) is a function of the U.S. price (Pus), the
effective use of pesticides (Kus – Rus), prices of
other goods, and prices of other inputs. Because
the prices of other goods and inputs are held con-
stant in this partial equilibrium model, they are
omitted from the presentation:
(1) Sus= Sus(Pus, Kus – RUJ,
where Kus is the unrestricted quantity of pesticide
used.
The inclusion of the difference between unre-
stricted pesticide use and the mandated reduction
allows the U.S. supply function to capture the in-
ward shift of supply due to the pesticide restriction
and matches the decision variable in figure 1.
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The demand function is found by maximizing
U.S. utility including an externality due to pesti-
cide use subject to a national income constraint.
Thus, demand for the commodity in the United
States, Dus, is a function of the own price, the
effective use of pesticides (Kus – Rus), income,
and prices of other goods. One contribution of this
demand formulation is the inclusion of the (Kus –
Rus) component. This term acts as an intercept
shifter variable for U.S. demand and represents a
choice variable for the policy maker. For positive
levels of restrictions (Rus > O), total pesticide use
declines (Kus – Rus < Kus) and DuslRus >0. In
this case, utility includes an externality associated
with agricultural pesticides. U.S. consumers re-
ceive positive benefits from the pesticide restric-
tion. This formulation can be used to capture dif-
ferences in the willingness to pay for goods pro-
duced with and without restrictions on pesticides.
In addition, the demand shifter is needed in the
model to calculate how U.S. consumer surplus will
change for different levels of U.S. pesticide restric-
tions, The U.S. demand is:
(2) Dus = Dus(Pus, Kus – Rus).
Exports by the United States (Xus) are the dif-
ference between U.S. supply and U.S. demand:
(3) xus = Sus – Dus.
The U.S. price (Pus) is linked to the world price
(Pw) by a policy intervention in the United States
(tUs.):
(4) Pus = Pw + tus.
Supply of the commodity in the European Union
(S~u) is a positive function of the internal EU price
(PEU), prices of other goods, and inputs in the Eu-
ropean Union. As in the United States the prices of
other goods and inputs are not shown to keep the
presentation cleaner:
(5) sEU = SEU(PEU).
Demand in the European Union (DEU) also
comes from a utility function which includes an
externality associated with U.S. pesticide use and
hence depends on the internal price, income, prices
of other goods and the U.S. effective use of pesti-
cides:
(6) DEU = DEU(PEU, Kus – RUJ
The European Union receives a positive benefit
when there is a U.S. pesticide restriction. The rea-
soning behind including the U.S, pesticide restric-
tion in the EU demand equation is that the grain is
homogeneous in that its characteristics are the
same. Once in the marketing system U.S. and EUMartin, Paarlberg, and Lee Bargaining for European Union Farm Policy 141
grain cannot be differentiated. But the process un-
der which it is produced affects the EU consumers’
utility as the EU dislikes the environmentally un-
friendly U.S. production practices. This is similar
to the dolphin-tuna issue where the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ruled that
Mexican tuna is the same as U.S. tuna despite the
dolphin unfriendly methods Mexico uses to catch
the tuna. The disutility the United States experi-
enced over the production process did not justify a
trade intervention in the dolphin-tuna case because
the products are identical.
Exports by the European Union are the differ-
ence between EU supply and EU demand:
(7) X S~u – DEU. EU =
The European price (P~u) is linked to the world
price by the policy (t~u) in this model:
(8) PEU = Pw + tEu.
This specification assumes that in the long run, the
European Union sets a mark-up on world price
rather than a strict price support. Because EU grain
policy consists of direct payments, paid set-asides,
green payments, intervention purchases, and trade
policies, this price linkage specification overly
simplifies actual policy.
The Rest of the World is described by an excess
demand function. Imports (Mw) are determined by
the Rest of the World’s price (Pw), the price of
other goods and the income in the rest of the world:
(9) Mw = MW(PW)
Finally, global equilibrium requires world sup-
ply to equal world demand:
(lo) Mw= XEU +Xus.
The next step is to formulate the policy problem
faced by the U.S. policy maker. It is critical to
distinguish between the optimal trade policy that
produces the maximum gains from trade for a large
exporter from the effects of an environmental
policy like pesticide restrictions (Krutilla). The
policy maker is assumed to maximize a welfare
function consisting of the weighted sum of pro-
ducer, consumer and taxpayer welfare. The welfare
of producers and consumers is measured by pro-
ducer surplus and consumer surplus, respectively.
Producer surplus is evaluated using the internal
U.S. price which is the world price plus any inter-
vention in the U.S. supply function which includes
the level of the pesticide restriction (Rus). Con-
sumer surplus also is evaluated using the domestic
U.S. price and, as shown by equation (2), includes
the pesticide externality. Taxpayer welfare is mea-
sured by the negative of budget costs. The costs are
found by multiplying the policy by U.S. exports of
the commodity.
The welfare measures of producers, consumers,
and taxpayers are weighted in the policy maker’s
welfare function to reflect their mar inal value to
}. the policy maker, The coefficient +Us N the mar-
ginal value the policy maker places on the welfare
of reducers relative to consumers. The coefficient
2.
4US IS the marginal value the policy maker places
on program costs relative to consumers (Paarl-





Wus= +Pus ~Sus(Pw + tus, Kus – Rus)dPw
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o
+ ~DuJPw + tus, Kus – RuJdPw
- +GuskJs%Js
The U.S. iso-welfare contour is found using ex-
pression (11) and the global market clearing con-
ditions. That is, the global market clearing identity
is used to determine the world price as a function
of the policies and the U.S. pesticide restriction.
This expression is then inserted into the U.S. wel-
fare function. With the initial observed outcome of
no U.S. pesticide restriction, no U.S. price inter-
vention, and the observed EU price support,
the initial level of U.S. welfare is U~s. By varying
EU policy, tEu, the level of the U.S. pesticide re-
striction (Rus) can be found such that U.S. welfare
remains constant to give the U.S. iso-welfare con-
tour. Additional U.S. iso-welfare contours can be
found by setting Uus at different values and re-
peating the process.
The EU iso-welfare contour is found in a similar
manner, The EU policy maker’s objective function
is structured like that for the United States, with the





WEU= +PEU ~SEU(PW + tEu)dPw +s
:DEU
(Pw + t,u, Kus - Rus)dPw
- +GEUtEUxEU .
The locus of points (tEu, I?us) which maintain a
constant EU welfare form the EU iso-welfare con-
tour. As in the U.S. case, the expression determin-
ing the world price is inserted into expression (12)
and the EU policy maker’s welfare for the initial
conditions is determined, t.l~u, Subsequently, Rus
is varied and a tEu is found such that U}u is con-
stant to determine the contour,142 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Data
Two empirical models are developed to test the
characteristics of the iso-welfare contours to deter-
mine if a bargain between the two parties is pos-
sible in the year 2005. To estimate the model, data
for production, consumption and trade for the
United States, European Union, and the Rest of the
World are taken from baseline data for 2005 de-
veloped by the Economic Research Service of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The supply and
demand elasticities are constructed from the re-
gional elasticities reported in Sullivan, Wainio and
Roningen (table l), The elasticity values are used
to construct linear demand and supply functions
calibrated to the 2005 baseline data. 1 The use of
linear demand and supply functions is restrictive,
but gives a quadratic welfare function and prevents
the iso-welfare contours from producing multiple
tangent points.
The procedure used to approximate the impact
of cutting pesticide use on U.S. output is estimated
based on yield reductions reported in previous
studies. The Knutson et al.; Olson, Langley and
Heady; Osteen and Kuchler; GRC Economics
studies’ results suggest, on average, that a 3090
supply reduction in coarse grains and oilseeds re-
sults from a total ban on pesticide use. The esti-
mate of the total pesticides used by coarse grains
and oilseeds in the United States comes from Ag-
ricultural Resources Inputs Situation and Outlook
(USDA/ERS).
The world prices for coarse grains and oilseeds
for 2005 are also from the baseline projections.
The future EU price intervention level comes from
The Agricultural Outlook 1997-2001 (OECD)
which projects the degree of EU intervention for
the year 2001. This level is assumed maintained
through the year 2005. The intervention level in the
European Union consists of an export subsidy,
compensation payments and set-aside payments.
The estimated total intervention in the European
Union is 34% for producers of coarse grains and
53% for oilseed producers. In the United States,
farm price support is assumed to be zero because
the 1996 farm bill decouples present producer sup-
port and reduces producer payments to zero by
2001. The pattern set by that legislation is assumed
to continue.
1The trade elasticities in this model are long-can elasticities and me
elastic. The excess demand elasticity facing the United States is –5.0.
These elasticities affect the results because they affect the ability of each
player to affect the world price. If the EU policy liberalization did not
raise the world price there would be no benefit to the United States. If the
U.S. pesticide restricting does not raise the world price the gain tn the EU
is reduced.
The welfare function includes explicit weights
for producer and consumer welfare and gover-
nment treasury gains similar to previous studies
(Sarris and Freebairn; Paarlberg; Paarlberg and
Abbott; Alston, Carter and Smith). The weights
represent the political environment facing produc-
ers, consumers, and taxpayers for coarse grains and
oilseeds markets. The U.S. weights are found by
solving the first order conditions obtained from the
United States maximizing its social welfare assum-
ing the observed policy and market outcomes are
optimal in each commodity model (Sarris and
Freebairn; Paarlberg and Abbott). For the Euro-
pean Union and the United States, the producer
weight in the coarse grains market is 1.3 assuming
the consumer and government weights equal 1.
The reason why the weight for the United States
exceeds 1 when there is no intervention is that
optimal policy for a large country like the United
States is an export tax. In the oilseeds market, the
marginal value U.S. (EU) policy makers placed on
producers relative to government cost is calculated
at 1.4 (1.5).
Coarse Grains Results
The results verify three characteristics of the U.S.
and EU iso-welfare contours in the coarse grains
market, First, there is a negative relationship be-
tween the EU support (tEu) and the U.S. pesticide
restriction (RUJ for both the U.S. and EU iso-
welfare contours (table 2). When the EU producer
support falls from 3470 to 25?Z0,the U.S. pesticide
restriction necessary to maintain U.S. welfare at
the initial level rises from Oto 7% of pesticide use.
The U.S. (EU) iso-welfare contours are negatively
sloped. The shape of the iso-welfare contours can
be inferred by evaluating the slopes at various
points along the contour. As the European Union
liberalizes domestic price support, the slope of the
U.S. iso-welfare contour becomes flatter and the
EU iso-welfare contour becomes steeper. This in-
dicates concavity (convexity) in the U.S. (EU) iso-
welfare contours making them suitable for a bar-
gaining solution.
While the iso-welfare contours for the United
States and European Union have the slope and con-
cavity necessary for a bargain, it must also be the
case that the iso-welfare contours further (closer)
from (toward) the origin indicate lower levels of
U.S. (EU) welfare. Initially tEu = 34%, and the
base U.S. (EU) welfare when there is a zero U.S.
pesticide restriction is $92,516.6 ($34,491) mil-
lion. When the U.S. welfare is cut to $92,000
million, then the U.S. pesticide restriction rises to
10.25 thousand tons or a 13.69?0reduction. Thus,Martin, Paarlberg, and Lee Bargaining for European Union Farm Policy 143
Table 1. Elasticities Used in the Empirical Models for Coarse Grains and Oilseeds
Coarse Grains’ 0ilseeds2
Region Demand supply Demand3 supply
United States -0.235 0.491 -0.383 0.593
EU- 15 -0.382 0.566 -0.452 0.719
Other Exporters4 -0,279 0.358 –0,557 0.075
Importers5 -0,222 0.279 -0.578 0,166
1 Total coarse grains derived as a weighted average of com and other coarse grains.
2Tota1 oilseeds derived as a weighted average of soybeans and other oilseeds.
3Demand elasticity for oilseeds derived from meal demand elasticities.
firade weighted &erage of exporting country elasticities.
5Trade weighted average of importing country elasticities.
Source: Sullivan, Wainio, and Roningen.
for a given EU protection (t~u) greater U.S. pesti-
cide restrictions (Rus) are associated with lower
U.S. welfare. The U.S. iso-welfare contours are
indexed toward the origin. When the EU welfare is
decreased to $34,000 million, then the EU support
decreases from t~u = 34% to 16%. Thus, for a
given Ru~, lower levels tEu are associated with
lower EU welfare.
Another requirement for a bargain is that the
willingness of the United States to offer a pesticide
restriction in exchange for reduced EU support as
measured by the slope of the U.S. iso-welfare con-
tour be greater than the restriction the EU requires
to reduce support. As table 2 reveals, the slope of
the U.S. iso-welfare curve is less than the slope of
the EU iso-welfare curve at each level of EU pro-
ducer support. This means that for each level of EU
producer support, the pesticide restriction which
the United States is willing to impose is less than
the minimum amount required by the European
Union and the condition for a bargain is violated.
The marginal rate of substitution values in table
2 are obtained from a model where the welfare
function does not recognize any external benefits
which the European Union and United States re-
Table 2. Combination of T~u and Ru~ to
Form the U.S. and EU Iso-Welfare Contour
Coarse Grainsl
Slope
TEU2 R“,? U.S. Case EU Case
25% 7% -.4355 -2,3505
16% 12% -.4253 -2.4113
8% 18% -.4166 -2.4616
4% 20% –,4105 –2.4950
o% 23% -.4066 -2,5186
‘W = Sum of Producer and Consumer Surplus and Gover-
nmentRevenue. Producer Weight in both the U.S. and EU =
1.3.
‘Initially –34%.
31nitial value 75.6 x 1,000 tons.
ceive from the United States imposing the pesti-
cide restriction. If the external values that the Eu-
ropean Union and the United States place on hav-
ing the United States restrict its use of pesticides
on coarse grains are considered, then a bargain
may exist because the relationship between the
slopes of the iso-welfare contours may become re-
versed. To indicate the external benefits to the Eu-
ropean Union and United States required to satisfy
the slope condition for bargaining, the differences
in the two slopes in table 2 can be used to value the
externality terms included in welfare functions
from the demand equations. This difference repre-
sents a measure of the externality that must exist in
the EU or U.S. welfare functions for a bargain to
begin (BNB). To simplify the results, it is assumed
that the U.S. externality from a pesticide restriction
is zero. This assumption reflects the observation
that the United States has not unilaterally restricted
use as would be expected if there is an externality
in the U.S. policy maker’s welfare. The expression
for the EU marginal rate of substitution includes
the EU externality since the criticism of U.S. pes-
ticide use being investigated originates in Europe.
This critical value is found by setting the ?vlRSu~
= MRSEU.
Table 3 reports the minimum benefits necessary
for a bargain (BNB) in the European Union which
indicates the magnitude of the externality required
for a potential bargain to begin.2 For a pesticide
restriction of 7%, the EU’s value from having this
U.S. pesticide restriction must exceed $78.2 mil-
lion. This may appear to be a large number, but is
only $.21 per person. If the European Union values
the benefits from having the United States accept
stronger environmental restrictions more than $,21
2 Benefits from the US. pesticide reduction are measured in monetary
terms and are not linked to actual pollutant levels. The benefits shown
are the minimum dollar level required to satisfy the bagaining condition.
Actual benefits may differ and would require application of non-market
vatuation techniques.144 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. T~u, Ru~ and BNB levels required by U.S. and EU Coarse Grains




ELI ‘ US Case EU Case Million $ in EU
34% o 0 64.9 .171
25% 7% 36% 78,2 .206
16% 12% 73% 86,3 .227
8% 18% 112,4% 93.9 .247
‘Initial EU Producer Support of -34%.
‘Initial value 75.6 x 1,000 tons.
31nitial value 75.6 x 1,000 tons.
per person, then all the conditions for a bargain are
minimally satisfied. The European Union places a
sufficiently high value on the U.S. pesticide re-
striction that it is willing to cut its protection
enough to make the restriction worthwhile to the
United States. If the European Union values a 770
U.S. pesticide restriction less than $.21 per person,
then no bargain is possible. As t~u is further lib-
eralized, the size of the BNB get larger, but at a
declining rate. This is because the pesticide restric-
tion that the United States is willing to offer and
that which the European Union must have grows
further apart as t~u is liberalized.
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the pes-
ticide elasticity for the United States (initially .3)
due to the uncertainty surrounding this elasticity. A
range of .1 to .4 was tested for the pesticide elas-
ticity. For a given EU producer support level, low-
ering the pesticide elasticity increases the maxi-
mum pesticide restriction (Rus) offered by the
United States and increases the minimum pesticide
restriction accepted by the European Union. The
externality benefits necessary to start bargaining
decrease as the pesticide elasticity is reduced. As
the pesticide restriction becomes less of a con-
straint on United States production of coarse
grains, the benefits the European Union must have
are smaller.
Sensitivity analysis is also performed on the pro-
ducer weight for the United States and indicates
that the U.S. producer weight has a significant ef-
fect on the shape of the iso-welfare contour. If the
U.S. producer weight of 1.3, which indicates a pro-
ducer biased policy, is replaced by a neutral value
of 1.0, as the European Union liberalizes the slope
of the U.S. iso-welfare contour increases indicating
the U.S. iso-welfare contour is convex not con-
cave. This violates one of the conditions required
for a bargain.
Oilseeds Results
The oilseeds market creates a different scenario
because the European Union is a net importer. This
change has an impact on the characteristics of the
European Union’s iso-welfare curve, but not on the
U.S. iso-welfare contour.
There is no longer a negative relationship be-
tween t~u and Ru~ for the European Union (table
4). The U.S. pesticide restriction causes the com-
modity price to increase which decreases the wel-
fare of the European Union. The European Union
does not receive positive benefits from seeing the
United States place a pesticide restriction on oil-
seeds. A bargain over pesticide restrictions in the
United States in return for liberalizing producer
support in the European Union is infeasible in the
oilseeds market.3
Summary and Conclusions
This paper assesses whether the conditions exist
for a bargain where the domestic producer support
3In this case, if the U.S. adopted a pesticide restriction without con-
sidering the external benefits, the U.S. would need to compensate the EU
by allowing higher support for oilseeds in Europe. A bargain might be
found if the externality in the EU is large enough to overwhelm the loss
in utility from the higher world oilseed price.
Table 4. Combination of TEUand Rus
to Form the U.S. and EU Iso-Welfare
Contour Oilseedsl
Slope
~=, : R r rQ3 U.S. Case EU Case
50% .6% -.013659 .6641
47% 1.2% -.013638 .6656
43% 1.7% -.013617 .6670
40% 2.3% -.013597 .6685
37% 2.9% -.013577 .6699
33% 3.4% -.013556 .6713
o% 9% -.013449 .6793
‘W = Sum of Producer and Consumer Surplus and Gover-
nmentRevenue, Producer Weight in both the U.S. = 1.45 and
EU = 1,5.
‘Initially –53%.
31nitial value 24.14 x 1,000 tons.Martin, Paarlberg, and Lee Bar-gaining for European Union Farm Policy 145
level in the European Union is reduced in return
for a pesticide restriction on coarse grains and oil-
seeds in the United States. There are incentives for
both regions to negotiate such a bargain, Both re-
gions export coarse grains and the two policies
would increase the world price for that commodity.
For the European Union, the reduction in the EU
support and the increase in the world price de-
crease EU outlays for agricultural programs. This
reduces the costs of new entrants from Eastern Eu-
rope. The U.S. pesticide restriction would please
EU farmers who contend that they have to be sub-
sidized in order to compensate for stricter environ-
mental laws. The United States would see im-
proved water quality and health benefits. Compli-
ance costs for U.S. farmers would be offset by
higher prices and exports.
A conceptual model shows that the U.S. and EU
iso-welfare contours must have particular charac-
teristics for a potential bargain to occur. This
model is tested for the coarse grains and oilseeds
markets. The iso-welfare had such characteristics
for both regions for coarse grains because they are
competing exporters. The U.S. iso-welfare con-
tours are negatively sloped, quasi-concave and in-
dexed such that increases in the U.S. restriction,
given a constant EU policy, lower U.S. welfare.
The EU iso-welfare contours are negatively sloped,
quasi-convex and indexed so that a cut in the EU
support policy lowers EU welfare for a given U.S.
pesticide restriction.
In the oilseeds market, where the European
Union is a net importer, the slope of the EU iso-
welfare contour is positive. The European Union
loses its incentive to tradeoff liberalization of its
support for a U.S. pesticide restriction. Thus, the
trade status of players in a particular commodity
market affects whether or not a bargain between
environmental and trade policy can be realized.
In the absence of including an externality for
U.S. pesticide use in the EU and/or U.S. welfare
function, the willingness of the United States to cut
pesticide use is less than the cut the European
Union must have to induce liberalization. If the
European Union places a large enough benefit on
the reduction in pesticide use, the cut in support
offered could be sufficient to induce the United
States to restrict pesticide use. In the empirical
model of the coarse grains market, that benefit
would need to exceed $0.21 per person.
It is critical to recognize that the foundation for
the shape of these two region’s iso-welfare curves
is the current political system and the emphasis it
places on producers relative to consumers and gov-
ernment revenue. A different political climate
would lead to different marginal utilities placed on
producers, consumers and government cost and,
therefore, lead to different solutions. Sensitivity
analysis reveals that the producer weight signifi-
cantly affects the shape of the iso-welfare contours
and whether a bargain can be reached.
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